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Abstract 
The beginning of the 1980s represented for many developing countries a particularly critical 
period. 
To escape economic and financial difficulties, these countries had to engage into economic and 
political reforms, often under the umbrella of international institutions. Such circumstances 
offered the chance to collect a wide range of comparable reform experiences and represented 
thus a big lab for testing existing theories on stability, growth, and development. 
Focussing on the reform experiences of the 1980s and 1990s, this paper analyses their 
underlying economic wisdom and tries, according to their main results, to extrapolate some 
guidelines for reform. Overall, the analysis points at the need for a tailored approach to reform, 
which takes into account a country’s peculiarities and its specific barriers to growth and 
development. 
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The Political Economy of Reform and Development of the 
Washington Consensus 
 
Economic reforms and their impact on growth, income distribution, quality of life, and 
development are controversial matters in economics and politics. From the last quarter of the 
past century it is hard to find a country, no matter its income level, which has not engaged in 
some kind of economic reforms.  By the end of the 1980s liberalization, market opening and 
deregulation became urgent issues for many countries and were in general interpreted as keys 
to increase or maintain competitiveness on the global market. Accordingly, political economists 
have elaborated a broad spectrum of partly competing theories on which policies and 
manoeuvres to apply, when, in which sequence, and how. 
The experience of the Latin American countries to escape the deep financial crises of the early 
1980s, the transformation of the former communist countries, and the strive for modernization of 
the oil rich countries of the Middle East as a response to the difficult economic conjuncture and 
fall in the oil prices of the 1980s have represented particularly interesting cases of study.  
However, because of the complexity and high context-dependency of this matter, a unique 
theoretical framework for reforms is unlikely to be found.  Nevertheless, different streams of 
thought have dominated the economic and political debate over time. A related matter, which is 
still somehow unsolved, concerns the measurement of the reforms’ result, i.e. defining proper 
measures and indicators to compare performance pre- and post-reform.  Besides, in the realm 
of reform policy there is often still confusion between means and ends: in particular concerning 
almost standard reform measures, e.g. privatisation and trade liberalization, it sometimes slips 
in the backstage whether such measures are aims per se or whether they are not but means 
towards the ends of rapid and more sustainable growth. 
In order to approach the complex topic of the economic policy of reforms, the analysis begins by 
focussing on the political dynamics that might strive toward or against economic, social, and 
political changes and focuses hereby on the role of crises for fostering reforms as well as on the 
different time strategies (gradualism versus big bang) that can be considered by reformers.  
Then, the dominant economic wisdom underlying the reform experiences of the past decades 
will be reviewed and the paradigm of the Washington Consensus will be analysed with respect 
to its basic economic rationale.  Main results from the reform experiences of different groups of 
countries will be shortly addressed, according to which main critique points and alternative 
approaches to reforms will be discussed.  Overall, the analysis aims at rethinking possibilities 
and challenges of reforms in developing countries and points at the importance of 
understanding the specific impasses and needs of these countries in order to define a broader 
goal of change and development. 
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1 The Politics of Economic Policy Reform 
The economic debate typically focuses on how, what, and when to reform, without arguing who 
is going to reform.  The approach of public choice might help in dealing with such a thematic. 
The basic underlying idea is that politics is a competitive business (Downs, 1957, and Maythew, 
1974) among individual wealth maximizers (Geddes, 1994). According to Geddes, policy-
makers face the “politician’s dilemma” between the short-run individual goals of political survival 
and re-election and the long-run collective goals of economic performance, stability, and regime 
survival. An immediate corollary of such a dilemma is the lack of incentives to promote the 
change from patronage to a merit-based system. In other words, the appointment policy of self-
interested politicians will serve individual short-term benefits, i.e. re-election and political 
survival, rather than pursuing the long-run societal wealth which could be more likely promoted 
by nominating competent and qualified civil servants. 
1.1 Motives and Sustainability of Reforms 
Reforms may have short term adjustment costs and may yield long run benefits if they are able 
to raise national income and to improve living standards and wealth.  From the point of view of a 
self-interested politician, reforms are politically costly, as they reallocate wealth among different 
groups of the population.  However, if the citizens realize the improvements achieved by 
reforms, this will automatically enhance the politician’s image and thus improve her re-election 
chances. 
Political sustainability and the success of reforms decisively depend on consensus building as 
well as on their credibility.  Building consensus on packages of reforms might be difficult to 
achieve even because the voters are typically status quo biased.  The status quo bias 
(Samuelson / Zeckhauser, 1988 and Kahneman / Knetsch / Thaler, 1991) which can be defined 
as the frequent tendency to opt for already chosen alternatives and might result into innovation 
aversion (Porter / McIntyre, 1984), has been proven to be a quite robust behavioral effect. It 
applies to many situations of decisions under uncertainty and has been also discussed in the 
context of political preferences (Fernandez / Rodrik, 1991). 
The aspect of credibility is particularly important (Olofsgard, 2003) as the citizens’ beliefs and 
confidence in the reforms’ implementation have a decisive impact on their sustainability and 
outcome.  If there is uncertainty about the implementation of the announced reforms, even 
potential winners from reforms might be reluctant to support them, as without a credible political 
will reforms might get stuck in a partial state from which others might win (Hellman, 1998).  
Obviously, credibility also relates to the politicians’ trustworthiness. 
The credibility of reforms can be enlarged when specialized agencies, financial and economic 
institutions are put in charge of their implementation.  Such authorities are independent or, at 
least, enjoy some margins of autonomy from the government, they are less sensitive to political 
pressures and are therefore freer to opt for slightly unpopular options and are more consequent 
in implementing the planned reforms (Haggard, 2000).  However, at least from a theoretical 
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point of view, the strategy to delegate power and functions to technocrats is a self-limitation of 
power and presents as such some paradox aspects: why should a politician limit her 
competences and delegate part of her power to specialized authorities?  From the politicians’ 
point of view, the establishment of financial and economic institutions can be interpreted as a 
binding commitment (Bates, 1994) which enlarges the credibility of reforms and also as a way to 
relieve politicians of the responsibility of unpopular reforms. 
Because of the potential political costs of reforms, rational self-interested politicians tend to 
avoid undertaking deep changes, as long as the electorate does not perceive them to be 
necessary.  It is difficult to predict and understand within an analytical framework in which cases 
policy-makers do have incentives to reform and which depth the undertaken reforms will 
assume.  Again, the basic argument is that in democratic societies politicians might be praised 
by successful reforms, e.g. by reforms yielding remarkable improvements in wealth and living 
standards of the majority of the population.  Since it is not always straightforward that even well 
designed reforms succeed in making the majority of the population better off in a politically 
relevant time horizon (i.e. the short run), the approach of rational partisan theory seems to 
provide a suitable explanatory framework for reforms in cases in which the population is divided 
into different groups of interests (Hibbs, 1977, Alesina, 1987, and Kiewiet / McCubbins, 1991). 
Assuming the segmentation of the constituency this approach models changes in the political 
course (to which also reforms and the creation of financial and economic institutions for their 
implementation belong) as a way to serve particular interests.  This perspective encompasses 
the possibility of rent-seeking which potentially leads a society into the so-called “public choice 
trap.”  This occurs “because neither egoistic political operatives nor recipients of government 
largesse can expect to benefit from efforts to bring about changes in the institutional framework 
that are necessary to restrict rent seeking” (Scrimgeour / Pasour, 1996, p. 259) and hinders 
therefore the reform process and in particular institutional reform. 
In societies that are governed by more authoritarian regimes, rulers usually do not have to 
directly answer for their political choices in front of the whole citizenship, but mainly have to care 
on the opinion of certain interest groups and elites that are strategic for the regime’s survival.  
Since the income distribution is typically favourable to those groups, they tend to be strongly 
biased toward the status quo and averse to reforms and changes that might threaten their 
privileges.  The aversion of such groups to reforms might be particularly critical to the regimes 
and even threaten its survival.  However, blockades to reform might be broken when the 
lobbies’ segmentation changes, either because of new emerging groups, international pressure, 
or different economic conditions.  In similar cases, a modified rational partisan theory might 
apply and rationally explain the rulers’ decision to undertake economic reform. 
1.2 Do Crises Cause Reforms? 
Both for democratic and more authoritarian societies, resistance to reform by powerful interest 
groups can be more easily overwhelmed in times of crises, where changes in the system are 
perceived to be unavoidable (see e.g. Ranis / Mahmoods, 1992). Even though there have been 
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also cases in which reforms were not an immediate response to severe political and economic 
crises (as the case of the quite comprehensive, even though not really successful, supply-side 
reforms New Zealand undertook between 1984 and 1996. For more, see e.g. Dalziel, 2002), 
most of the countries undertook deep reforms during periods of instability and difficulties. 
It is vividly debated in the literature (Ranis / Mahmoods, 1992; Bresser / Luiz / Maravall, 1993; 
Rodrik, 1996), whether a crisis is “the instigator of reform” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 26) and whether 
substantial reforms are possible without criss.  Among the arguments supporting the so called 
“crisis hypothesis,” which postulates a causal link between crises and reforms, are that crises 
make reforms become urgent and “create the political imperative for better economic 
performance.” (Krueger, 1993, p. 109).  In particular, since economic crises have costs that are 
higher than the economic and political adjustment costs of reforms (Bresser et al., 1993), they 
lower the “net” costs associated with changing policy,
i
 and therefore provide sufficient incentives 
for changing the political course and reallocate economic resources.  Observing history, it 
seems to be true not only that reforms follow crises - which is “is no more surprising than smoke 
following fire” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 27) -, but also that the depth of the changes is related to the 
severity of the economic and political conditions faced by a country.  There is mixed empirical 
evidence in this regard, as the relation between the severity of a crisis and the depth of reforms 
is too complex to be interpreted according to a linear pattern and is also sensitive to the 
indicators revealing the crisis.
ii
 
1.3 Gradualism Versus Big Bang 
By undertaking reforms, their speed and pacing represent another critical political issue which 
might affect costs, efficacy, consensus building, and social impact of the whole reform process. 
Policy-makers have to choose between a big bang and a more gradualist approach to reform.  
They can namely either introduce whole packages of reforms rapidly in a concentrated time 
interval or implement them gradually, spreading them over a longer period of time (Wei, 1997).  
To be more precise, a gradual approach should be differentiated from a piecemeal approach. 
Rather than consisting in implementing reforms one after the other without considering possible 
interdependencies between them (Murphy / Shleifer / Vishny, 1992), gradualism implies the 
“sequential implementation of minimum bangs” (Wei, 1997, p. 1236) that are minimal bundles of 
interdependent reforms. 
There is no consensus on which approach is more promising and also observing past reform 
experiences contrasting empirical results does not allow to definitely corroborate the one or the 
other strategy. While on the one hand reforms that are implemented as shock therapy might 
yield for faster benefits (World Bank, 1991) and enable to achieve coordination between single 
measures more easily (Murphy et al., 1992), on the other hand a big bang strategy might imply 
the risk of failure of the whole reform process just because of problems in certain domains 
(Rodrik, 1989). A further possible pitfall is that targets and instruments of different reform 
measures might be conflicting (McKinnon, 1973), so that the simultaneous introduction of 
reforms might even be counterproductive. Supporters of the gradualist approach, on the 
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contrary, underline that only gradualism allows adjusting the course of reforms by trials and 
errors (World Bank, 1991) and weighs less on the state budget (Nielsen, 1993). 
Opinions are diverging with regard to which of these strategies minimize the adjustment costs of 
reforms: while some sustain that introducing reforms more rapidly lowers the costs associated 
with transition and allows therefore speeding up the resource reallocation (Mussa, 1984), others 
argue that diluting reforms over time enables to spread out their costs, make consensus easier 
to build (Gavin, 1996), and weaken resistance (Corbo / Fisher, 1991). 
According to Wei (1997), “a ‘good’ reform program may not be able to overcome political 
resistance if it is implemented by a big bang, but it may become politically viable if it is 
implemented by a gradualist approach.” (Wei, 1997, p. 1237). The counterargument is however 
that in case of a shock therapy, potential opponents to reforms might have no time to organize 
themselves to resist and oppose reforms with efficacy (Krueger, 1992). Furthermore, resistance 
might be higher in case of prolonged reforms. (Lal, 1987). 
Contrasting arguments are represented also concerning the aspect of credibility of the reform 
process. While it might be argued that the speed of reforms fosters credibility (e.g. Lipton / 
Sachs, 1990), it is also plausible to sustain that a gradual implementation might enhance 
incremental credibility (Fang, 1992). 
Considering that reforms imply choices under uncertainty, allow for flexibility with respect to 
time, and are at least partially irreversible, reforms have been also modelled in a real options 
setting.iii In this perspective, gradualism has an option value, offers higher flexibility, as well as 
larger possibilities of reversal. Also relying on this line of interpretation, policy recommendations 
are in competition and depend on the country’s specific assumptions about costs and benefits 
of reforms as well as about their probability distributions (Katz / Owen, 1999). 
Numerous alternative analytical models similarly conclude that under different conditions 
opposite prescriptions might apply. Modelling differences in the initial government’s 
commitment, Fang (1996) shows the superiority of a gradualist strategy by low initial 
commitment to reform and that of a big bang by strong political commitment. Wei (1997) further 
argues and analytically models that if both strategies are politically feasible “i.e. either in the 
absence of a status quo bias in a democratic setting or in a benevolent-dictator setting” (Wei 
1997, p. 1245) a shock therapy would have the advantage of sooner benefits and be therewith 
more efficient. 
Thus, the issue of optimal pacing of reforms is a complicated and highly situation specific 
matter, as “in presence of multiple distortions […] policy is working in a world of second (or 
higher) best.” (Corbo / Fisher, 1991, p. 7) Decisions on the optimal path and speed of the reform 
process are crucial in imprinting their results as there is the danger that “an inappropriate 
sequence may render the adjustment process more difficult or even contribute to the collapse of 
the whole reform program.” (Funk, 1993, p. 337). 
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2 Towards the Definition of a Reform Agenda 
As clearly emerges from its definition
iv
 speaking about “reform” requires to codify what is meant 
to be an improvement and by whom. Whenever it comes to significant changes to the political 
economy of a country, it is hard to avoid vested interests trying to manipulate such changes and 
the reform process. The informational advance, which ruling elites and influential groups of 
power possess, might lead to the self-selection of reforms and to misguiding reforms to serve 
particular interests (on the self-selection of reforms, see Stiglitz, 2000, p. 551). 
The prevailing economic orthodoxy which affirmed in the late 1970s gave priority to economic 
growth rather than to income distribution and social goals, and considered the social costs of 
reforms as short term inevitable side effects (Emmerij, 2007, p. 38). This way of thinking was 
surely inspired to the experience of the East Asian tigers and to the failure of protectionist 
policies in propelling industrialisation and sustainable growth (Rodrik 1996, p. 13). This “new” 
orthodoxy, based on condemning import substitution and massive state intervention not only 
“became the economic strategy of the West but, through its adoption by the World Bank and the 
IMF it became the conventional wisdom of practically the entire globe, whether voluntary or not.” 
(Emmerij, 2007, p. 38) 
Thus, a consensus emerged about what measures should be undertaken by a country willing to 
solve economic and financial shortcomings as well as to create the basis for more sustainable 
growth. Basic categories of reform packages were macroeconomic stabilisation and structural 
adjustment, which respectively depict measures and programs seeking to stabilize the 
fundamentals of an economy and promote its structural transformation by addressing the long 
term fundamental causes of a country’s poor economic performance. In the short term, 
stabilization programs essentially focus on reducing fiscal deficit and restoring internal and 
external equilibrium by means of promoting a real devaluation and controlling inflation. Fiscal 
adjustment is a central issue, as it also creates the basis for long term reduction of inflation. 
The key of structural adjustment lays in creating proper incentives to economic competition and 
rent-seeking avoidance. This requires the development of specific strategies for each country, 
which encompass their peculiarities. Considering the experiences of the 1980s, this translated 
into “deregulating domestic goods markets, reforming the public sector, liberalizing the trade 
regime, removing constraints on factor employment and mobility, and removing obstacles to 
saving and investments, and (on) strengthening institutional elements.” (Corbo / Fischer, 1991, 
p. 2). Reform attempts originated a “movement away from state control to a market oriented 
economy” (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 551) and were inspired to the aims of “stabilization, liberalization, 
and opening up.” (Emmerij, 2007), p. 38). 
After macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, which constituted the building 
blocks of first generation reforms, many less developed countries engaged into a second 
generation of reforms, addressing institutional design and trying to improve living standards. 
While first generation reforms “were intended to get macroeconomic fundamentals in place” 
(Corbo, 2000, p. 63), successive reforms extended to the public sector, to the judicial system, to 
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social security, education, and health, that were explicitly encouraged and supported by the 
international community and institutions, as they pursued the aims of promoting growth, 
improving equity and social mobility. 
While first generation reforms were the response to the repercussions of the economic crises of 
the early 1980s, the reasons for many countries to undergo further transformation are more 
complex: on one hand, economic performance and growth were not up to the expectations and 
for the less developed countries were not sufficient to significantly improve the quality of life for 
the majority of society; on the other hand, insufficient institutional capabilities have been 
recognised to be a decisive factor undermining development and stability for many countries. As 
in World Bank (1997), institutional weaknesses can be considered to be essential responsible of 
low growth rates. 
In many developing and middle income countries, this second wave of reforms can also be 
related to the ascension to power of young groups of technocrats with Western education and 
orientation (Corbo, 2000, p. 63). Second generation reforms are still an ongoing process for 
many countries and guidelines are to be collected from specific experiences. Unique 
prescriptions on how to achieve the ultimate objectives reforms aim at are still missing, even 
because there is no clarity about the dynamics underlying failures and underperformances. 
2.1 In Search for a Reform Agenda 
The global debt crisis of 1982 and the collapse of many Latin American countries represented a 
lab for testing existing theories on how to achieve stability, growth and promote development. 
The reform policies the Latin American countries undertook during the 1980s were moved by 
the urgent need to drag the crisis and were run under the supervision of international 
institutions, first of all the World Bank and the IMF. 
Typical stabilization programs to escape the debt crisis comprehended fiscal consolidation, 
monetary contraction, exchange rate adjustment, and gave priority to inflation reduction, which 
had reached double-digits (see IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2012) in almost the 
entire region and in Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru had even risen to four-digit levels. 
Restoring macroeconomic balance through the drastic reduction of inflation and current account 
deficits were motivated by considering macroeconomic stability an essential precondition for 
sustainable growth. 
Due to the short-term trade-off between inflation and output, monetary policy yielding a 
predictable and low inflation creates a favourable climate for long-term economic growth (see 
Fischer, 1996). Awareness also grew that the benefits associated with the Phillips curve mainly 
refer to the short run. Further reasons to pursue price stability were that high rates of inflation 
have evident high political and economic costs (Corbo, 2000, p. 68) and especially penalize the 
poorest. Bulir / Gulde (1995) provide an interesting discussion of the link between inflation and 
income distribution. 
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Besides stabilization, reform packages aimed at improving resource allocation by pursuing 
reform in the domains of trade, privatization, public sector, labour, and financial system. 
The leading principle was to let the markets work, crushing thus with the idea that had circulated 
up to that time that “the developing countries came from a different universe which enabled 
them to benefit of (a) inflation (so as to reap the inflation tax and boost investment); (b) a 
leading role for the state in initiating industrialization; and (c) import substitution.” (Williamson, 
2002). 
The Bretton Woods institutions assumed a pivotal position in directing reform efforts and in 
providing financial support to developing countries. To encompass the “desirable set of 
economic policy reforms” (Williamson, 1990) which sifted from the prescriptions of the 
technocratic circles of the international financial institutions, of the US government and of the 
Federal Reserve Board, Williamson (1990) introduced the concept of “Washington consensus.” 
2.2 The Washington Consensus 
The so called “Washington Consensus” comprehends the ten policy instruments that were at 
the time typically prescribed or advised for those countries of Latin America striving towards the 
“standard economic objectives of growth, low inflation, a viable balance of payments, and an 
equitable income distribution.” (Williamson, 1990). Thus, “many economists […] would see the 
Washington Consensus as a pragmatic distillation derived from some four decades of post-war 
experience in a host of developing countries.” (Harberger, 2000, p. 549). 
A premise on the misuse of this concept may be due: in its original formulation by Williamson, 
“Washington Consensus” was intended to describe “10 policy instruments about whose proper 
deployment Washington can muster a reasonable degree of consensus” (Williamson, 1994) or 
“a list of ten policies that I [Williamson] thought more or less everyone in Washington would 
agree were needed more or less everywhere in Latin America.” (Williamson, 2004, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, the consensus has been often interpreted as a normative benchmark to which 
reform attempts should refer. In this interpretation, the consensus has become the target of 
many critiques: in Williamson’s own words “the term is often being used in a sense significantly 
different to which I had intended, as a synonym to what is often called ‘neoliberalism’ in Latin 
America, or what George Soros (1998) has called ‘market fundamentalism.’” (Williamson, 1999), 
p. 1). 
The concept of Washington Consensus gained great popularity. Among the reasons that played 
a role there was the ideological vacuum which was left after the collapse of Socialism. The 
downfall of central planning “created an urgent need for an alternative set of ideas about how to 
organize economic and political life.” (Naim, 1999). The consensus conveyed prescriptions 
which were based on rather basic macroeconomic principles and which constituted a defined 
plan for action. It was advocated by prestigious institutions and endorsed by reputed experts, 
and, most of all, it was the key to get financial support from the international institutions and 
community. In its World Development Report for 2002 the World Bank recognises that most of 
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its programmes from the 1970s to the 1990s were actually inspired by the content of the 
Washington Consensus (World Bank, 2001, p. 62). 
The ten policy instruments Williamson encompassed under the “Washington Consensus” will be 
listed as follows. If not differently specified, the analysis refers to Williamson (1989), (1990), 
(2003) and (2004). 
Fiscal Discipline 
It should be noted that opinions diverge whether fiscal discipline means a balanced budget or if 
it offers some margins for tolerance. In a period of crisis a too drastic reduction could run the 
economy into a recession, so that some analysts are prone to tolerate deficit as long as its 
share of GNP does not rise, while some others simply focus on a non increasing debt to GNP 
ratio. However, even though plausible of different interpretations, fiscal discipline remains an 
essential point of a reform agenda, as sound public finance also prevents inflation and capital 
flight. As a general prescription, by considering whether to run a fiscal deficit, policy-makers 
should carefully weigh the associated long-term costs and compare them with the expected 
positive effects of the enlarged spending programs and / or tax reductions. 
Reorientation of Public Expenditures 
Fiscal deficit can be reduced either by increasing tax revenues or by lowering expenses. By the 
end of the 1980s international institutions feared that the first way would further hamper 
economic growth and therefore almost consensually favoured the second way. This however 
“did not call for all the burden of achieving fiscal discipline to be placed on expenditure cuts” 
(Williamson, 2004, p. 3) but rather posited the question to discriminate between more and less 
important components of public expenses programs. In the technocratic circles opinions 
seemed to converge that while education, health and public investments should be encouraged, 
subsidies are a typical voice that has to be cut. 
The possibility of saving by military expenditures is typically considered quite a delicate issue 
involving the state’s sovereignty, so that there was the tendency to consider them out of the 
competences of economic policy advising. Military expenditures remain however a controversial 
and debated issue. 
By the reorientation of public expenditures, cutting subsidies was a central prescription of the 
Bretton Woods institutions and became in many cases a condition for loan disbursal. Subsidies 
bias the price mechanism and create inefficiencies. Whether price distortions should always be 
blamed is a controversial matter and opposite views can be theoretically corroborated adopting 
respective a first- or a second-best approach. Cutting subsidies on basic goods and 
commodities has often encountered strong resistance from the poorest groups of the society, as 
the Karak’s riot of 1989 in Jordan clearly showed. 
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Tax Reform 
Even though the typical prescriptions on how to achieve fiscal balance centred on controlling 
expenses, the reform of the tax system has also been a pillar of Washington’s advising. Hereby, 
the rationale of tax reform consisted in broadening the fiscal base and introducing moderate 
marginal tax rates which was among others the principle by which the 1986 US reform of the 
income tax was inspired. 
Interest Rate Liberalization (Financial Liberalization) 
With respect to the financial markets, the basic objectives were to increase transparency and 
discourage capital flight, two aspects that needed to be solved for Latin America but also apply 
for many other developing countries. Market-determined interest rates represent a way to tackle 
these aims, as they reduce the range of arbitrariness by mean of which credits are rationed and 
under which conditions. Furthermore, capital flight can be discouraged through positive interest 
rates, which tend at the same time also to stimulate savings. 
Competitiveness of the Exchange Rate 
Besides liberalizing interest rates, a “competitive” exchange rate was considered to be 
meaningful in order to achieve stability and enhance economic growth. The basic advice for a 
developing country was to bring the exchange rate at a level that does not discourage exports, 
but at the same time that does not excessively amplify the debt’s burden. An appropriate 
exchange rate should improve the competitiveness of domestic production in international 
markets, favouring exports and creating suitable conditions to attract foreign investments. In 
Williamson’s words, an appropriate exchange rate should be “consistent in the medium run with 
macroeconomic objectives” (Williamson, 1990) and reflect the concept of fundamental 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
Trade Liberalization 
A fundamental lesson by which the reform policies of the late 1980s were inspired was the 
failure of import substituting policies, so that trade liberalization was a sine qua non of reform 
packages. The switch to an outward oriented economy, which had to be pursued by a 
competitive exchange rate and by the removal of barriers to trade, aimed at capturing the 
growth benefit of integration in the international market. The positive correlation between 
economic growth and openness has been corroborated both by theoretical contributions and 
empirical evidence (Dollar, 1992; Lee, 1993; Sachs / Warner, 1995; Feenstra, 1995; Edwards, 
1998; Harrison, 1996; Frankel / Romer, 1999). 
Foreign Direct Investments 
Foreign direct investments have often been interpreted as a propulsive force of growth and 
development. In the World Bank Statistical Database under “foreign direct investments” are 
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meant “the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.” 
Besides the capital inflow, foreign direct investments contribute to the domestic economy in 
term of know-how, technical and administrative skills. For heavily indebted countries equity 
swaps have recently become a widely practiced way to reduce the debt’s burden and attract at 
the same time foreign investments. 
Even though the benefits of foreign direct investments are widely recognized, the inflow of 
foreign capital might be also associated with macroeconomic risks, both in the sense of 
transmission of international disturbances (Jansen / Stokman, 2004) and in relation to their 
inflationary risks. 
Privatization 
State owned enterprises have been a characteristic feature of many developing countries: 
public ownership represented a possibility to promote industrialization and development 
compensating for the lack of a strong domestic private sector. In the eye of a reforming 
government, privatization offers the benefit of helping sanitizing public deficit, both because of 
the revenues from the enterprise’s sale and the reduced cash flow injection and investment in 
the firm. If for other reform measures it is possible, at least in principle, to discuss potential 
associated benefits and / or dangers, this is not the case for privatization. Privatization can be 
namely a beneficial process which helps promoting competition and efficiency, but can also turn 
into a “highly corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for a fraction of their true 
value.” (Williamson, 2002). 
Deregulation 
As Balassa et al. (1986) observe for Latin America, numerous regulations were constraining the 
markets’ mechanism, among which “controls on the establishment of a firm and on new 
investments, restrictions on inflow of foreign investments and outflow of profit remittances, price 
control, import barriers, discriminatory credit allocation, high corporate income tax rates 
combined with discretionary tax reduction mechanism, as well as limits on firing of employees.” 
Securing Property Rights 
Whenever property rights are not sufficiently safeguarded, incentives to undertake 
entrepreneurial activities might fail. Therefore, it was widely agreed that governments 
concerned to promote growth and development should find mechanisms to secure private 
property rights at reasonable costs, in order to make business venturing profitable and improve 
the economic potential of a country. 
3 Economic Reforms between Dreams and Reality 
“Meant well, tried little, failed much” Krueger (2004) 
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In the 1990s, it was commonly believed among economists that countries reached economic 
growth due to economic reforms and that, correspondingly, countries that did not reform enough 
would fail to experience remarkable economic growth. The diversified evidence at the end of the 
1990s contradicted this simple equation. 
The whole approach to economic reforms which was embodied by the Washington Consensus 
was definitely questioned by the wave of deep financial crises that shook many countries (e.g. 
Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Brazil in 1998, Russia in 1998, Turkey in 2000, and 
Argentina in 2002) as well as by the fact that whereas most of the countries that followed the 
Consensus failed to achieve sustainable growth and economic development, some other 
countries that did not apply the consensus’ prescriptions (e.g. China, India, and Vietnam) 
managed to achieve high economic growth. 
As recognized by the IMF in its accurate report of 2005, in spite of promising initial results, the 
end of the 1990s was characterised by stagnation in the real per capita income and insufficient 
improvement in the social indicators, e.g. poverty rates and income inequalities. Overall, “from 
an institutional and structural perspective, reforms were uneven and remained incomplete.” 
(Singh et al., 2005, p. xiv). 
In Latin America, despite of the apparently positive trend of the first half of the 1990s the second 
half of the decade was characterized by economic slowdown. The huge capital inflows of the 
early 1990s, which were mostly due to international borrowing and privatization revenues, did 
not raise real investments but rather tended to sustain consumption (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 17). They 
did not reflect into sustained economic growth (cf. Fig. 1) and may have created, because of the 
volatility of capital flows and associated over-optimism on capital markets, some of the premises 
for the successive financial crises. 
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Fig. 1: GDP growth (annual percentage change at constant prices) for selected Latin 
American countries (Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008) 
 
Among the countries that did not conventionally apply the Washington Consensus, mixed 
results can be found: while high economic growth in East Asia ended in the unexpected deep 
financial crisis of 1997, China’s and India’s policy choices seem to have set the basis for more 
sustainable patterns of growth. 
Several East Asian countries (namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) managed to achieve high growth rates, which were 
sustained from 1965 up to the first half of the 1990s, as well as equitable income distribution. 
Among the reasons for such a success, a mix of “fundamentally sound development policies, 
tailored interventions, and an unusually rapid accumulation of physical and human capital” 
(World Bank, 1993) can be mentioned. 
The governments of these countries were able to calibrate and direct their intervention to foster 
the development of specific industries, among else by means of subsidizing and protecting 
domestic industries in strategic sectors and encouraging their export orientation, convert 
domestic financial savings in real investments, as well as encourage a rapid human capital 
growth (World Bank, 2003). The East Asian successes can be interpreted as “miracles of 
accumulation rather than of productivity” (Rodrik, 1996, p. 13) and might be ascribed to the joint 
effect of qualified labour force and exceptionally equitable income distribution (Rodrik, 1996, 
p. 20). 
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In this context, a financial crisis of the magnitude and severity like the one which exploded by 
the end of 1997 was fully unexpected. This was the result of the vulnerability of the financial 
systems, of corruption, and weak corporate governance (Radelet / Sachs, 1998a, p. 1) which 
had been underestimated also because the continuing economic growth prolonged the 
investors’ confidence. In this setting, the first signs of the crisis generated panic reactions which 
further augmented its size (Radelet / Sachs, 1998b). 
The take-off of China and India (which account for approximately 40 % of the developing 
countries’ population) together with Vietnam also puzzled the conventional economic wisdom. 
These countries followed a heterodox gradual approach to reform, which was based on 
progressively opening up some sectors while maintaining protection on some others, and on 
fostering integration into the global economy reducing stepwise, but not fully eliminating, state 
intervention. 
In particular, from 1978 China started a gradual but ambitious reform process, which followed a 
“learning by doing” approach and was inspired by the goals of “reducing the dominance of the 
public sector; reducing the commitment to an egalitarian distribution of income; alleviating 
poverty and increasing material living standards; and maintaining macroeconomic stability and 
social order.” (Angresano, 2005, p. 484). 
China’s privatization policy started from the agricultural sector and small- and medium-size state 
owned enterprises. The privatization of large state owned firms was initiated in the late 1990s 
and was preceded by restructuring and more efficient managing (Chow, 2005). In essence, the 
Chinese privatization policy consisted in encouraging the private sector maintaining the scope 
of the public sector almost constant, also in order to minimize social tensions. Nevertheless, 
following this gradual strategy the private sector can now be estimated to represent almost 
75 % of GDP (Angresano, 2005, p. 485). 
Besides, by running fiscal deficits China also violated the dogma of macroeconomic stability. 
While in 1979, China had no public debt, only 20 years later debt has raised to 20 % of GDP. 
Fiscal deficit has been in particular due to the running costs of maintaining the large-scaled 
state owned enterprises. The increasing tax inflow from the grown private sector nevertheless 
ensures that fiscal deficits do not exceed 3 % of GDP (Angresano, 2005). 
Overall, the adopted policy mix not only sustained long-term high levels of economic growth (cf. 
Fig. 2), but also enabled a significant reduction of poverty and improvement of living standards.
v
 
In 2001, because of its achievements concerning trade liberalization, China also became 
member of the World Trade Organization. 
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Fig. 2: China’s and India’s GDP growth rates (percentage at current prices) and per capita 
GDP (PPP in international $) (Data source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 
October 2008) 
 
4 Critique and Alternative Approaches to Reform 
In its attempt of prescribing a basic fixed set of policies on “what a poor country should do to 
become more prosperous” (Naim, 1999, p. 1) the Washington Consensus exclusively focused 
on a relatively narrow palette of macroeconomic variables and expected from their repositioning 
a trickle down effect in order to promote wealth at all levels of society. 
Challenges to its prescriptions soon also came from changes in the international and political 
environment
vi
 which signalised the limitations of the Washington Consensus as a suitable 
growth strategy because of its relative short term orientation. In this sense, it has probably been 
expected too much from its prescriptions, forgetting that they were first of all a contingent 
answer to the urgent need to help developing countries to escape the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
By the end of the 1990s it became clear that reforms did not bring about what they promised. 
The economic performance of countries which followed the prescriptions of the technocratic 
Washington was to a large extent disappointing (Krugman, 1995): not only the reforms failed to 
catalyze sustainable growth and foster long run stability, but liberalisation policies neither 
resolve misallocations, nor effectively combat rent-seeking. Reforms also failed to remarkably 
enhance living standards, smoothen inequalities, and serve democratization. The sensitivity on 
these issues grew and a more articulated conception of development in which social objectives 
such as democracy and human rights play a central role started to affirm. Also the aims of 
inequality and poverty reduction, which were not explicitly encompassed by the Washington 
Consensus and by its interpretation of reforms, progressively turned into essential principles of 
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the debate on growth and development, as commented, e.g., by World Bank’s “Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers” of 1999. 
The debate on the results of the wave of reforms of the 1980s and 1990s inspired the search for 
alternatives and improvements to the Washington Consensus. Thus, new sets of policies and 
new labels trying to correct and / or improve the prescriptions of the consensus and interpret 
emerging approaches to development were created, such as the “Post Washington Consensus” 
(Stiglitz, 1998), the “Augmented Washington Consensus” (Rodrik, 2002), the “After the 
Washington Consensus” (Kucznynski / Williamson, 2003) and the “Barcelona Consensus.”
vii
 
Besides, several attempts have been made to define an agenda for the so-called “second 
generation reforms” which “may be seen as the set of measures needed to enable a country to 
attain, in a sustained way, high-quality growth” (Camdessus, 1999). 
Early critique to the paradigm of the Washington Consensus mainly referred to the social and 
political costs of reforms which were not considered as serious drawbacks of market oriented 
policies. Further important critique to this paradigm targeted the tendency of underestimating 
the economic costs of the reform process believing their size to be negligible and their impact to 
be confined to the short term. 
The original mistakes of the intellectual basis underlying the Washington Consensus were that 
reform packages were set to be universally applicable and that their formulation relied on a 
neoclassical conception of the economy, thus characterized by complete markets. Rethinking 
on the results of reforms, also the World Bank recognizes that “there is no unique universal set 
of rules” (World Bank (2005), p. xiii) and signalizes thus the need to “to get away from formulae 
and the search for elusive ‘best practices’ and rely on deeper economic analysis to identify the 
binding constraints on growth.” (Idem). 
The Washington Consensus erroneously believed that market oriented reforms could have 
been achieved following a standardized bundle of policy actions. Macroeconomic stabilization, 
liberalizing and opening up the economy “have been interpreted narrowly to mean ‘minimize 
fiscal deficits, minimize inflation, minimize tariffs, maximize privatization, maximize liberalization 
of finance,’ with the assumption that the more of these changes the better, at all times and in all 
places - overlooking the fact that these expedients are just some of the ways in which these 
principles can be implemented.” (World Bank, 2005). 
The Washington Consensus offered a technical solution to the complex problematic of 
sustainable growth and development and this together with the simplicity of its underlying 
economic doctrine may have been some of the reasons for its success. It can be however 
argued, that to its simplicity also the failure to promote the broader goals of development, stable 
growth, and improvement of living standards might be ascribed. 
In particular, “the ‘one-size fits all’ policy reform approach to economic growth and the belief in 
‘best practices’ exaggerated the gains from improved resource allocation and their dynamic 
repercussions, and proved to be both theoretically incomplete and contradicted by the 
evidence.” (World Bank, 2005, p. 11). The advantages of a more targeted approach to reforms 
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have in-between become clear. Such a tailored approach “requires recognizing country 
specificities, and calls for more economic, institutional, and social analysis and rigor rather than 
a formulaic approach to policy making” (World Bank, 2005, p. xiii). 
Further critiques which have been posited to the Washington Consensus are both the 
sufficiency and necessity of many of its dictates, the imbalance between goals and objectives, 
the misunderstanding of many of the reforms’ possible complementarities and interactions, as 
well as the underestimation of the importance of the political economy of reforms. Reforms were 
formulated relying on a too stylized and simplistic interpretation of real economies, which 
conceived them like idealized market economies. The underestimation of the institutional 
framework and of the need to secure private property and competition in order to manage the 
transition to a market oriented economy was one of the consequences of such a simplistic 
belief. The goals of macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, and privatization became aims 
in themselves and not just means and steps towards the more ambitious objectives of 
sustainable equitable growth and development. These goals were somehow reductive but at the 
same time not easy enough to achieve as intermediate objectives. 
The main guideline which can be derived from the critique to the Washington Consensus is that 
reforming should perceive the centrality of institutions in determining the results from changes. 
The institutional framework should in particular care to strengthen the social safety net to 
compensate and protect the disadvantaged for eventual costs associated with the transition as 
well as to safeguard property rights and regulate bankruptcy and contracting. 
The Washington Consensus essentially aimed at eliminating regulatory frames and state 
intervention in the economy. In doing that, it failed to pay attention to the theory of the second 
best, according to which in presence of market imperfections the abatement of certain 
distortions does not necessary yield positive effects for the economy. The theory of second best 
highlights the importance of calibrating reforms considering markets’ imperfection and 
incompleteness as well as the existing institutional frames and conditions and also points at the 
centrality of the relations among reforms. Relying on these considerations the importance of 
designing economic reforms targeting ambitious goals which have to be reached stepwise 
following a series of reasonable intermediate objectives has been emphasized (Stiglitz, 2000). 
The Washington Consensus also did not pay sufficient attention to the delicate issues of 
sequencing and pacing of reforms. The idea that reforms had to be rapid was spread and there 
was a clear preference for shock therapy, as gradualism tended to be interpreted as a “lack of 
reforming virility.” (Williamson / Zagha, 2002). This way, however, reforms’ complementarities 
cannot be sufficiently exploited. Almost everywhere, reforms which could be fast and easily 
undertaken were pushed ahead, and those which would have required more time and / or would 
have affected more sensitive interests have been postponed. For example, the success of 
privatization also decisively depends on more demanding institutional reforms. All too often, 
however, even in order to fulfil loans’ conditionality, just easier steps of reforms have been 
accelerated and their embedment in the institutional specific framework and / or synergies with 
other reforms were left to the backstage. 
 19 
A related matter is that also the adverse effects of reform should have been encompassed in a 
second-best perspective: the impact of market failures might be different in developing than in 
industrialized countries in which welfare and social safety nets, as well as living standards might 
help coping with reforms’ adverse effects and mitigate distributional consequences. The 
Washington Consensus failed to pay sufficient attention to the impact of reforms on capital 
asset values, as well as on social and organizational capital. In particular considering the reality 
of the less developed countries, distributive aspects have been just marginally considered, as it 
has been mostly concentrated on national income as a measure of the reforms’ results. In most 
of the cases, changes have not been Pareto improvements and the necessary compensation 
mechanisms to protect the most disadvantaged by the transition have not been created. 
This, together with the insufficient attention paid to the sequencing of reforms, also badly 
affected credibility and sustainability of the reform process. As it emerges from this discussion, 
pacing the reform process and eventually revising its intermediate objectives according to the 
economic and political conditions and responses would have helped encompassing and 
minimizing the adverse effects of transition. 
A further aspect which needs to be carefully considered but which has been often neglected by 
the Washington Consensus is the confidence in the reform process. Confidence in the reforms 
was among others undermined by inconsistencies between action and advise, by corruption, by 
the existence of hidden agenda, and by the pressures of strong influence groups which 
sometimes misguided reforms. More basically however, the non participatory nature of many of 
the reform experiences seriously compromised their implementation and results. Thus, some of 
the reforms failures can also be ascribed to the political process by which reforms were 
administered and promoted. Governments could not convince the people that reforms would 
have made large groups of the society better off and, in particular in developing countries, the 
reform agenda did not always capture the population’s real problems and needs. Reforms have 
rather been perceived like dictates from the international community. The prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus did not catch the importance of understanding the particular political 
dynamics of the different countries, looked uncritically at the existence of vested interest 
supporting part of the reform program, and underestimated the centrality of consensus building 
for the political sustainability of reforms. 
Even though it is correct that reforms should also aim at eliminating economic rents emerging 
from misallocations, the approach followed by the Washington Consensus mistook rents’ 
elimination and efficiency promotion for a sufficient growth and development strategy and 
underestimated the dangers of wrong sequencing and timing. 
5 Conclusion 
Economic and political reforms are still a debated and controversial issue in technocratic, 
political, and academic circles. Designing effective reforms is not a deterministic task, but 
involves modelling the economic, political and social system and formulating a certain 
conception underlying economic and social development. 
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Even though it is hard to find a country which has not engaged in some kind of economic 
reforms during the last three decades, there is still uncertainty concerning what a country should 
do in order to promote economic growth, reach a more equitable income distribution, improve 
living standards and foster development. What is still to many extents unclear is what are the 
most suitable measures and whether there is an optimal reform agenda in order to achieve 
these aims. 
In the course of time, such questions have been differently answered, also depending on the 
respectively dominant economic doctrines. The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have been 
decisively inspired by the economic wisdom which affirmed in the late 1970s. This gave top 
priority to economic growth rather than to social aims, relying on the principle that stable 
macroeconomic fundaments and high economic growth would mirror into a trickle-down effect 
and improve therewith the quality of life and living standards for the majority of the population. 
These principles lead to elaborate the precise reform agenda of the so-called Washington 
Consensus. 
From the analysis of the reforms’ main results, it emerges that the Washington Consensus 
essentially failed to achieve its aims. Its approach was flawed, as it relied on a too stylized 
interpretation of the economy and narrowly focussed on the economic goal of fostering 
competition in order to promote growth. It moved from a first-best conception of the economy 
and underestimated therefore the importance of strengthening the institutional and legal 
framework. In this sense, the Consensus referred to a macroeconomic paradigm which is not 
really apt to describe real economies and in particular the reality of developing countries. 
Giving top priority to economic issues, the typical agenda of the Washington Consensus 
neglected social goals and also insufficiently considered the systemic nature of the reform 
process. 
Besides, the Consensus followed a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to reform and believed in the 
existence of an universally applicable formula for growth and development. It is now widely 
recognised that there is no such an equation and that there is no standard way to reform. 
This means that each country and the international institutions should think of tailored reform 
agenda, which take into account each country’s peculiarity and address its specific needs. 
Reforms should further rely on participative mechanisms and include all layers of the civil 
society in order to increase acceptance and reduce resistance to reform. This implies, in 
particular for developing and transition countries, the need to promote democratization and not 
to picture economic reforms as something unrelated to political reforms and social 
transformation. 
Pointing at the failures and recognizing the inadequacies of the Washington Consensus does 
not mean however that everything was wrong or that what has been done has to be reverted. 
The reform movement also had merits, first of all that even less developed countries perceived 
the need to change, and to set up means and coordinate efforts to pursue a specific agenda to 
foster growth, promote development, and enhance living standards, in order to integrate in the 
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global economy and correct, rather than reject and oppose, globalization.
viii
 Furthermore, it can 
also be mentioned that reforms yielded important intellectual advances concerning the 
understanding of growth and development as they represented a sort of “hothouse” for testing 
the existing wisdom and paradigms. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 According to Drazen and Easterly (2001), p. 133, the net cost of reforming is “the cost of changing policy 
relative to remaining with the status quo.” 
ii
 Drazen and Easterly (2001), considering the magnitude of the post crisis recovery in term of economic 
performance as proxy for the depth of reform, provide evidence that whereas hyperinflation and high black 
market premium induce deep changes, high current account and budget deficit do not. 
iii
 One of the first approaches in this regard is the one elaborated by Dewatripont and Roland (1995). 
iv
 To “reform” means “to put into a new and improved form or condition; to restore to a former good state, 
or bring from bad to good; to change from worse to better […]” Cf. the entry “reform” of the Webster’s 
Revised Unabridged Dictionary, Stand of 11
th
 Nov. 2009. 
v
 While from 1981 China almost halved its poverty headcount ration at 2 $ a day (cf. World Development 
Indicators Database), in Vietnam “30 percent of the population has moved out of absolute poverty” (Cf. 
World Bank, 2005, p. 39). 
vi
 Besides the collapse of the centrally planned economies, Camdessus mentions that „there has been 
another major development during the past decade, quieter perhaps, but of tremendous long-term portent: 
the acceleration of globalization.“ Cf. Camdessus (1999). 
vii
 The Barcelona Consensus emerged from the joint efforts of Olivier Blanchard, Guillermo Calvo, Daniel 
Cohen, Stanley Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Jordi Galí, Ricardo Hausmann, Paul Krugman, Deepak Nayyar, 
José Antonio Ocampo, Dani Rodrik, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrés Velasco, Jaime Ventura, 
and John Williamson gathering for the Barcelona Forum 2004 
(http://www.barcelona2004.org/eng/forum2004/portada.htm). 
viii
 The underlying idea is that “globalisation is to be rejected, but that its agenda should be corrected.” Cf. 
Rodrik (2002), p. 3. 
